Army Objective Force
"A force projection
Army that is decisive
across the
full spectrum
of conflict in tl
2 1 s lGmtu ry"
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
09 April 2001
Agenda
• Decisiveness
• Illustrative Scenario:
Operational Environment
^National Command Authority (NCA)
Guidance
Military Objectives
• Objective Force in future scenario:
^Entry Operations
^Decisive Operations
• Pursuit of Technology
• Summary
Purpose
Illustrate:
•Objective Force - essential to
executing decisive Joint operations
•Challenges of emerging operational
environments
• Significance of Army support to the
CINC
•Key operational capabilities of the
Objective Force
Define " DECISIVENESS "
•Ability to accomplish strategic goals and
objectives
•Decision is achieved by:
^The ability to force an enemy to succumb
to our will and cease to resist
Physically destroying enemy's capability
to fight
Breaking enemy's will by:
> Inflicting more destruction and
disintegration of control than the enemy
can bear
> Forcing capitulation to negotiate
settlement
What Constitutes
DCCiSiVGnGSS
•Operations other than war
Solidify partnerships / relationships
^ Enforce peace
^ Prevent crisis
•Smaller Scale Conflict / Crisis (SSC)
Re-establish regional stability, lasting peace
s Halt genocide, end refugee flow
Eliminate threats to regimes
• Major Theater War (MTW)
Counter offensive to rapidly conclude conflict
^ Significant reduction of risk to US / Allied forces
Enable rapid swing between theaters if second
conflict erupts
How Force Projection Army
Brings Closure to Joint
Operations
•Supports CINC by establishing multi-dimensional area
of influence
•Cements vital coalitions, helps stabilize governments
• Directly attacks enemy anti-access strategy
• Immediately alters crisis conditions
Despite significant challenges of time sensitivity,
anti-access and a complex environment...
•Accomplishes decisive military action to achieve
CINC / NCA stated objectives
Bottom line: Closure is assured and rapid
Illustrative
Scenario
( 2010 )
• Azerbaijan: Pro-Western President; Opposed by
radical Islamic dissident faction supported by Iran
Iran providing military support to Armenia to
increase pressure on Azerbaijani government
Armenia invades Azerbaijan to regain lost
territory
Islamic dissident faction demands resignation of
Azerbaijani president
Iran positions substantial military forces along the
Azerbaijani border; postured towards Baku
Russia proposes a joint US / Russian operation to
halt Armenian aggression, restore previous
border, and deter Iranian intervention in the crisis
Operational Environment
NATO expansion in region
Tension between Russia and
Tu rkey
Instability in Former Soviet
Union states
Religious/Ethnic fault lines
Aggressive China
Simmering India / Pakistan
situation
Islamic Fundamentalism
International
terrorist groups
International
corporate business
Religious groups
Nomadic non-
aligned groups
Operational Environment
Failed states
Ethnic hatred and genocide
Imbalance of economic power
and resource distribution
Disillusioned emerging
democracies
Growing disenfranchised
factions
Increased internal criminal
Proliferation
of
Conventional
& Weapons of
LL ,> h I r • liU ■
■u.i ' J .
L ! 1 h^ |J :
Fundamental!
st
Movements
Terrorist &
Insurgent
Activity
All Factors Localized in the Caspian
Reaion
US Strategic Interests
in Caspian Region
2010
• Increased US & allied access / influence to
Stabilize region
Preclude failed states / open hostilities along
tribal, ethnic, & religious lines
^ Ensure balance of power in region
Promote good governance, free market
economics, basic human rights
s Promote adherence to rule of international law
• Preclude conflict escalation to hostilities
• US investment in energy resources
Potential Crises On Many
Fronts:
Amrit^r
Turke
China
Regional
actors take
steps to wield
influence in
Caspian
region
External
states drawn
into ootential
India
Conflict Patterns
•Mechanized and Armored units,
supported by artillery and rocket
attack rapidly from multiple
Long Range - High Altitude
sophisticated Air Defense
systems are dispersed and
deployed in Armenia,
ran
GPS and
Electronic
jammers
deployed
I 1 1
Conflict Patterns
•Special Purpose Forces target
and take direct action against
reserves, communications and
airfields
Infantry and Engineers
establish ambush sites
in complex terrain
SCUDs and Cruise Missiles
are dispersed and
camouflaged prepared to
strike APODS and SPODS
Conflict Patterns
•Azeri refugees and POWs
are positioned in camps
around dispersed artillery
and MRL batteries
•Local citizens are organized to report
enemy troop movements and
•Armenian refugees
in Turkey are
encouraged
to sabotage air
•Air Assault Infant^ggyerrilfas,
positioned to strike supply lines and
Conflict Patterns
•Iran positions MRL and
long range artillery
along the border.
MANPADs, RPGs, mortars and
explosives are smuggled to Islamic
diML: | r a n i a n television and
radio station conduct
Information Operations.
• Iran positions submarines in the
Black Sea and along the
Dardanelles
Insurgent Areas
•Incite Riots ‘Sniper*
• Raids
‘Ambushes
•Terrorism
• Reconnaissance
Caspian
400 km
Challenge: Strengthening
the Government of
Azerbaijan
•Weakened Azerbaijani government in
danger of collapse. If Azerbaijani
government collapses...
^Externally supported (Iran) radical
Islamic faction will form new hostile
government
^Terrorism, civil unrest and civil war
s Insurgents will attempt to control
populace through mass media (radio,
TV, papers); 10 campaign
Challenge: Supporting
the
Azerbaijani military
•Azerbaijani military rapidly losing its
fight with Armenian forces
s Azeri Military Forces require
reinforcement or support to remain
cohesive
•Armenia capable of conducting
operations to limit, interrupt and deny
access
^Equipped with cruise missiles, SCUD
ballistic missiles and long range
precision multiple rocket launchers
Challenge: Decisive
■ I ^VIUJIVII
•Iranian forces are postured near the
Azerbaijani border
Significant conventional ground
forces: (3 Mechanized Divisions,
and 2 Armored Divisions)
s Sufficient strength to rapidly
overwhelm Azeri forces and occupy
Baku
Supported by ballistic missile and
sophisticated air defense forces
National
Command
Authority
★ ★★★★★
***********
***********
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
★ ★★★★★
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
★ ★★★★★
GClidcft USJjorce to separate belligerents
• Preclude intervention by regional aggressor militaries
• Expel invading forces
• Reestablish legitimate international boundaries
• Establish conditions for negotiated settlement and
long-term International Observer Force
• Safeguard US force and interests in theater
Within Four Weeks: Stop continued aggression, and
secure border areas
Within Eight - Twelve Weeks: Expel invading forces,
re-establish legitimate international border, and
prepare
to defeat aggression by any regional military forces
Bak
Control
Insurge
nt Areas
Deter
Iran
km
400
Caspian
Sea
Secure
Oil
fields
Bolster
Azerbaijani
Military
Halt
Armenian
Advance
Turke
y
Suppo
rt
Azeri
Gov't
CINC Military Objectives
• Stabilize Azerbaijani government, force
insurgents out of capital city, quell
unrest
• Deter or defeat Iranian forces. Prevent
illegitimate occupation
• Halt Armenian forces
• Restore Azerbaijan / Armenia border
• Establish and maintain coalition
CINC Intent
• Show US commitment from the outset
• Immediately engage the near term threat to Azeri
sovereignty, which is the invading Armenian force
• Deter Iranian intervention by first demonstrating
commitment to engage all forces that threaten an
attack on Azerbaijan, its forces or people
• Support Azeri counter insurgency operations with
inte , log, psychological and information
operations, legal and police support
• Stabilize, then attack to destroy if Armenian
forces won't leave Azeri soil
• Demonstrate intent by directing powerful strikes
at key Armenian centers of gravity
Centers of Gravity
IVVVJ/
• Azerbaijani government: Primary COG ,
time sensitive*
• Forward positioned Iranian forces: Time
sensitive*
• Armenian military forces: Time
sensitive*
• Successful action against these
COCs establishes the conditions that
enable the following actions:
^End Azerbaijan - Armenia hostilities
./ri.- i ■ i :
i i i
Army Objectives
•Stabilize Azerbaijani Government
•Form multi-national coalition
•Halt Armenian advance
• Eject Armenian forces
•Deter Iranian aggression
•Restore stability in Azerbaijan
•Be prepared to evacuate non-
combatants
Problems in Foreseeable
Future
Lack of Theater
Infrastructure
D/stdJScteir & Naval Power cannot stop aggression
in time
•No US Ground Forces forward deployed in
theater. Have to deploy from:
^ CONUS
^ Central Europe
•Lack of mature infrastructure complicates
access and sustainment
•The Joint Force can't get there from here...
limited lift, air and sea ports, time sensitive
US Forces
Available
Time
To do this
Army forces have to be light enough to deploy rapidly, but mobile and lethal
enough to be decisive
Forces will have to fight in different ways:
s Flexible doctrine
s Overmatching combat power from S & T
s Smaller but more capable, agile and versatile organizations against the most
advanced threats
s Adaptive and adept leaders
s Innovative, professional soldiers
s Joint / Army integrated C4ISR as key enabler
Implication for the National Military
Cf Am#
To achieve strategic success in the future, the Service
and the Joint Force must apply different metrics to the
force effectiveness equation.
The Objective Force is
therefore centered on:
Changing the paradigms of Responsiveness, Deployability, Vt
Agility, Survivability, Lethality, Sustainment - So that the Natio
the Joint Force Commander will have...
"A Force Projection Army that is decisive across the full spectrum of
warfare in the 21st Century"
Assess Army Today /
Tomorrow Aqainst CONOPS
Challenges
Time
Environment
Threat
Friendly Forces
Concepts
Define
Failure at any critical task results
in failure to meet NCA and CINC guidance
Assessing Today's Force
Against Future Dilemmas
* Power Projection
* Assured Access
* Entry Operations
* Decisive Operations
* Sustain
30
Dilemma - Power
Projection
Power Projection / Time
Task / Purpose: Rapidly deploy land
forces into AOR to respond to crisis in
C91ft©ri*9*-esolve with
immediate credible
presence on the ground
•Stabilize Azerbaijan
government
•Secure population, oil
fields and entry points for
follow-on forces
•Establish Coalition Task
Force
•Support CINC strategy to
deter Iranian aggression
■,^kr Georgia \
& # Ok
\o <#
Armenia AzeraPjas^
o^o! /
Turkey
<>
o
Challenges to Power
Projection
• Time sensitivity
• Environment:
Size of AOR, imposing geography, weather extremes
Diverse terrain - combination of open / rolling,
urban, close and complex, mountainous
Austere infrastructure - class 40 roads and bridges,
few developed air and sea ports, few options for
combat service support
Limited host nation support - fuel, water, food
Challenges to Power
Projection
• Four simultaneous enemy problems:
^ Regional anti-access strategy
In WEST, Armenian aggression (230km from
Baku)
s In SOUTH, Iran postured to invade (180 km from
Baku)
^ At Baku, insurgent role is overthrow the
government, invoke terror amongst population or
damage the oil fields
• Coalition / Alliance:
Azeri military is struggling to halt Armenian
attacks
Azerbaijan government on verge of collapse
Alliance vital interests not clearly threatened
Power Projection Concept -
Today
TODAY
strategic Lines of
Communication
(LOCs)
^ Light DRB in 24-72
hours
Light force lacks
lethality, mobility,
survivability and
staying power
Initially, information
only by sensors
s Lin£ar4>attlespace
taging base
^ Army Divisions tied to LOCs
^ Extensive force build-up
required
5-1/3 Divisions deploy in over 75
days
Requires large staging bases
Counter offensive forces
Require deep water ports <
Army pre-positioned stock
Power Projection Concept -
CORE CAPABILITIES
<
Tactical aircraft with
strategic legs to carry
soldiers and equipment
Speed by air and sea
Not reliant on sea and air
ports
By-pass anti-access to
unimproved strips
Credible air-ground Task
Force in 120 hours. Can
fight upon arrival
Lethal, mobile, survivable
force
Get in rapidly with
credible combat power
that can deal with
challenges
Self-sustaining for 3-7
days, then establish
staging bases to sustain
the force
Entry / decisive operations
blur
I nt I nn ictirc Hwo r fh<
AIR
PORT
I AIR
STRI
S - Very Tailora
BLACI
SEA PORT
Army Aviation self-
deploys from Europe
(1200nm)
OBJ BDE
IN 96
HRS
OBJ DIV
IN 120
HRS
Today can't get
5 divisions and
2 corps in to do
these things
2 CORPS
HQ
5 DIV IN
30 DAYS
Turkey
CASPIAN SEA
SEA PORT
Tailorable to needs of
CINC
Maneuver
Maneuver support:
s Recon, Surveillance,
Target, Acquisition
s Joint Precision Strike
Counter insurgency
Army Aviation (Recon,
Attack, Lift)
s Joint C3I
Civil Affairs, MP Psyops
How Objective Force Deters
Objective: Impose will to deter aggression by Iran and
stabilize region
How:
•Establish credible, multi-dimensional presence with a
division in 120 hours and 5 divisions closing within 30 days
•Get dominant maneuver capability on the ground early on
•Aggressive reconnaissance, surveillance and target
acquisition in depth integrated with joint sensor network
•Neutralize enemy capability with precision strike
•Wage information operations campaign to dissuade
aggression
See, understand and act first to neutralize
enemy capabilities while signaling US
^ Government stable
s Coalition with
Russia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Turkey
s Non combatant
evacuation ongoing
^ Baku and oil fields
secure
s Sea and airports
secure
^ Initial Joint C3I
Network in place
^ Developing the
situation % m
39
Dilemma - Assured
Access
Growing Anti-Access
HAuGiiMG THREAT
Zl aa NUKE/BIO/CHEM
SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCE
TERRORISTS
5 MINES ^ B
CRUISE MISSILES & UAV
BALLISTIC MISSILES&
ROCKETS
SUBMARINES
FIXED & ROTARY WING
AIRCRAFT
BLUE WATER NAVY
TODAY
2000
Low
2015
HOW IT'S CHANGING
Anti Access is becoming a
significant Threat
Emerging
Capabilities
NBC
SPF / Terrorists
TBM / Cruise / UAV
Air and Missile Defenses
Counter Precision & ISR
Submarines and Mines
Effective C4 & ISR
Information Operations
Maintain Threat of
WME/D
Missile and long range
fires on airfields and
ports
Introduce SPF for
intelligence and direct
action against key
facilities-airfields, ports
and staging areas
Threaten strikes
against neighboring
states for allowing
access
Leverage commercial
world
aracterized by Proliferation of Lower Cost Alternate
Influence World
Opinion
Attack Alliance &
Anti-Access
Objective
Threaten
Neighbors for
Allowing Access
Deny Objective
Force Entry at
Airfields and Sea
Ports
Direct Action
Against
Facilities
Gain Inf
ormation on
Deploying Forces
Target and Disrupt
Forces - y
Target and Destroy
Facilities
Missiles & Long
Range Fires on
Airfields and Ports
Legend
Anti-Access
strategy
orgia
Azerbaija
Armenia
Objective Force Assured
Concepts
Avoid anti-access targeting strategy by:
Reducing reliance on airfields and ports. Airland first division
Task Force
Conducting dispersed entry in unimproved area
Adjusting entry points en route to permissive and semi-
permissive areas
•:
rganization
Neutralizing air defense and missile attack at point of entry
Rapid operationa^^^^^yer upon entry
Organizational autonomy at
the lowest level
Define
Objective Force
I I I I J
Capabilities
En route remote control of
ground and air sensors
Organic full-spectrum design
Logistic and sustainment
mobility
Organic multi-dimensional
intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance
Embedded Special Forces
coordination element for
situational awareness and
point of entrv securitv
* Tactical aircraft with
strategic legs not
dependent upon airfields
that deliver a highly mobile
force that can fight upon
entry
* Localized short range
missile defense
* Suppress short range air
defense
43
Dilemma - Entry
Operations
Entry Operations Task /
Purpose
Rapidly stabilize AOR to set conditions
for decisive operations:
• Expand lodgment to assure access / freedom
of action
• Establish safe haven for Azeri government
and populace
• Establish coalition land forces in Azerbaijan
and Georgia to display US resolve and
commitment
• Deter Iranian aggression
• Protect lodgments from TBM strikes
Entry Operations - Today -
(Under Ideal Conditions)
s Linear battlespace
s Mature Infrastructure
s Secure Staging Base
^ Contracting options for
supplies
s Long standing coalition /
alliance
s Over 75 days for 5+ Divisions
Pure light Infantry
Lack lethality, mobility,
survivability and staying
'power
orces
s Enormous logistics
footprint
s Reliant on PREPO stocks
s Not easily deployable
s Deep water ports
s Time required for
reception, staging,
onward movement and
integration into gaining
commands
CONOPS Comparison -
General purpose
forces for offense,
defense, stability
and support
operations in any
terrain required
• tstaonsn coalition la'nd
forces
AOR
Link up with Azeri forces
* Dynamic defense with
offensive
stop aggression
LUty to
Armenian
aggression
Vertical insertion
of mounted forces
Employ credible baseline force
• Establish links to Joint sensors/
Comms
• Establish control of forces tailored to
mission need
• SASO in Baku
• Secure air /(^Y^orts for follow-on
forces
*
f
1 Division
120 Hour
Multiple,
simultaneous entry
points
Not tethered to
impr oved air and sea
Directly deter
Iranian
annroccinn
Caspian
ea
How Objective Force is Decisive
in Stability and Support
Operations
• Stabilize crisis in Azerbaijan and commence support
operations undertime sensitive pressures
• Deter aggression immediately
• Counter insurgency with effective internal defense
program
• Demonstrate ability to protect population and oilfields
• Stabilize the government in Baku
• Gain confidence of population and international support
• Establish coalition land forces
Today - only uniquely-trained and task organized forces can accom
Tomorrow - any Objective Force unit can accomplish on call
Objective Force Entry
Operations
Concepts
* Simultaneous
operations
* Distributed
operations
* Flexible organizations that
can quickly tailor to mission
needs
* General purpose forces with
special purpose capabilities
* Combined arms air-ground
Task Forces
* Precision strike
* Army long range fires to
shape / shield the force
* Integrated sensors
* Army aviation (Recon / Attack /
Lift)
* Vertical maneuver of mounted
forces
* Theater Ballistic Missiles
* Mine / counter mine
* Counter-insuraencv
Entry Operations Endstate
•Baku and oilfields secured
•Armenian advance contained and isolated
•Precision strike capability in place
•Iran deterred
•Azerbaijani government stabilized and in
power
•Shielded, assured access for follow-on forces
•Coalition land forces established
50
Dilemma - Decisive
Operations
Decisive Operations Dilemma
Define " DECISIVENESS "
•Ability to accomplish strategic goals and
objectives
•Decision is achieved by:
^The ability to force an enemy to succumb
to our will and cease to resist
^Physically destroying enemy's capability
to fight
^Breaking enemy's will by:
> Inflicting more destruction and
disintegration of control than the enemy
can bear
> Forcing capitulation to negotiate
Decisive Operations:
Task / Purpose
• Conduct counter-offensive to repel
Armenian forces
• Restore territorial sovereignty of Azerbaija
• Eliminate counter-insurgency
• Resolve conflict in terms favorable for
peace enforcement
• Destroy long range precision strike threat
(deny sanctuary to Armenian forces)
• Respond to Iranian brinksmanship
Decisive Operations
Georgia
Armenian
aggression
— u^r 1
ft
Insurgent
Areas
* Reconnaissance
* Snipers
* Raids
* Ambushes
* Terrorists Active
* Incite riots
A h " 1 ‘
Azerbaijan
Current Situation
* Azerbaijan government
stabilized
; * CINC has seized initiative
* Armenians transitioning to
defense to preserve gains
* Iran deterred thus far
* Deterrence force in position
TBMs
Iranian forces
postured to
invade
— ,
Decisive Operations
BMs
Why we carTt do this today
* Can't deploy 5 divisions through limited ports
* Can't logistically sustain
* Attacks on single axis
* Fighting units optimized for sequential
operations:
s Plan
s Prepare
s Attack
s Pursue
^ Exploit
s Plan
££k‘/-. S C
Cannot alter
conditions
* Cannot enter
w/ credible
force
COUNTER
INSURGENCY
aijan
DETER
ONTAIN
. . ' DETER
Iran
FORCE RATIO
1: 1.5
p .
-- J
■
Single axis
Terrain & enemy call
for light forces which
lack combat power
jtu _ 1 ir > v
J
FORCE RATIO
1: 1.5
TRADITIONAL BATTLE CALCULUS SAYS
WE NEED 3 OR 6: 1
equir
Corps
Task
forces
cour
INSU
aijan
Corps TF
HQ
Decisive Operations
For CINC to get closure, his force must simultaneously:
* Attack on 2 fronts and be prepared to fight on 3 rd
s Attack key Armenian forces and decisive points throughout
area
^ Continue stabilizing capital area
^ Continue counterinsurgency operations
^ Have operational flexibility to counter Iranian intervention
qia Ti
Corps TF ^
hq
NCY
w® >
id p^PP
.- 4^1
rft t j/ "jP-. jH
Iran
TAN
>1
CONTAIN
Lodgment
-i 7\ Air* *F[
AGGREGATE FORCE RATIO
i 1: 1.5
AGGREGATE FORCE RATIO
TRADITIONAL BATTLE CALCULUS SAYS
1: 1.5
WE NEED 3 OR 6: 1
Through shaping and Dominant Maneuver *
CORPS of 2001 CANNOT DO THIS
generates up to 9:1 at point of decision
"■■■ ^ ■ ...
Dominant Maneuver
1. Develop situation out of contact at tactical standoff
2. Conduct fires on objective at tactical standoff
3. Maneuver to position of advantage out of contact
4. Combine maneuver and fires simultaneously employing
tactical standoff. Isolate objective
5. Continue adjustment to changing situation during
engagement seeking advantage through combined
arms maneuver
6. Conduct tactical assault against enemy forces to finish
j i —
Why Corps And Divisions
In The Objective Force
CORPS
The Corps links ground forces and
fight to joint assets and campaign
Combined Arms
Air-Ground
ivision Task Fore
l
Combined Arms
FCS Maneuver
Brigade
• Principal means for corps
executing dominant maneuver in
decisive operations
Provides tactical direction to brigades
^ Provides access to Joint, long range
fires and aviation fires
'Principal Unit of Action
^ Principal formation for closing with
and destroying enemy
Habitually organized, cohesive teams
58
Dilemma - Sustainment
Dilemma - Sustainment
Task / Purpose: Build and sustain
decisive combat power in austere,
complex environment
Objective Force
150 km
OBJ
Refuel / resupply
On the move
OBJ
Non-contiguous
expanded
battlespace
Vulnerable Lines
of
Communication
Base clusters for
security
Situational
awareness allows
agile resupply
What's Different
• Large stockage of repair
parts (1235 Lines)
• Recovery: Dedicated assets
• Scheduled resupply at least
daily
• Significant combat service
support requirements
• Log Demand 528 Short Tons
• Log operations planning
centric / reactive
• Commonality (# of major
systems): 13+
• Ready-To-Fight: Requires
RSOI
7
■
~ OBJECTIVE^
k FORCE A
Less than 400 lines
Self / Like vehicle recovery
Every other day or as needed
Limited combat service support
requirements thru ultra-reliability,
commonality, and fuel efficiency
180 short tons
Execution centric / anticipatory
Commonality (# of major
systems): 5+
Fights Off-the-Ramp: Minimal RSO
n
Science and
Technology
Objective Force Pursuit of
Technoloov
Focus of Science and Technology Efforts:
• Survivability : Integrated approach and denial of shot
opportunity to the enemy
• Lethality: Rapidly responsive and accurate effects with
direct sensor to shooter links across an effects network
(NET Fires)
• Power and Energy: Alternative and ultra efficient power
sources and fuel usage - Includes multi-functional power
for FCS, directed energy weapons, and soldier power
systems (batteries)
• Responsiveness: Ability to deploy rapidly and support
operations from austere forward areas
• Soldier and Leader: Improved training and cognitive
intelligence tools. Enhance stamina and performance
Objective Force Pursuit of
Technoloov
• Integrated Sensors: Sensor packages to provide all-
seeing capability of enemy to enhance tactical
standoff fires, maneuver and assault
• Communications: Reliable non-line-of-sight voice and
digital communications. Includes requirement for full
communications during aviation precision strikes
• Other Kev Areas Include:
s Extend tactical reach of fires
Mine / counter mine technology
^ Intra theater Air Mobile operations
Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle technologies and
linkages between manned and unmanned platforms
^ Logistics demand reduction (ammo, fuel, repair parts,
and consumption)
Pursuit of Technology - Lethality
Objective Force NET Fires in Support of
Maneuver
• 300 lb payload
• > 2500 NM Range
• 24 hour loiter time
• Integrated sensors / communications pac
RF Tagging
"Passive" location and status repo|
Reduced bandwidth requirement
Reduced detectability
• No power requirement
NET F res
Indirect fires capability
Modular multi-mission precision munitions
Platform interdependent .... Manned / unm
r 1
• Instant clearance of fires
• Direct sensor to shooter linkage
• Enhanced BLUEFOR COP & increased lethc
Pursuit of Technology - Survivability
Active
Protection
System
(APS)
Mine
Detection &
Neutralization
Kill The Enemy
First
(See-
Understand-Act
- F M>
Don't
Be ...
Robotics
Advanced
Armo
Smart Armor
s Sensor
^EM Armor
^Enhance
Ceramic
lectromagnetic
Armor
Situational
Understanding
s See First
s Understand First
s Act First
^ Finish Decisively
ANODE (I
Pursuit of Technology - Power &
Lithium Ion / Polymer
High Energy Density
Zinc Air Packs
Fuel Cells
Pulse Power
s Capacitors
^ Fly Wheels
^ Inductors
Silicon Carbon switcl^es^^^
Li Ion Batteries
Multi-MJ Flywheel
High Density Capacitors
High Power AC Induction Motors
IJlwfei* m Jrn
IkLwm H
* 0 % v». )«i I .1
Today's Technologies To Be
Carried
Forward To The Objec RA y06F€omaBche
Raptor
ntelligent
Combat
Outpost
Raptor will be comprised of
acoustic overwatch
sensors, an artificial
intelligence platform (the
gateway), and a ground
control station, and lethad
or non-lethal muf^t^,rk. BAND
Ku-BAND
MILSTAR
WIN - T
The Warfighter Information
Network - Tactical (WIN-T) is
mobile, secure, survivable, and
seamless C4ISR capable of
supporting multimedia tactical
information systems.
Comanche provides leth
survivable, manned air
reconnaissance for the
7
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Objective Force
wm
Army ARFOR / EECP
Today's Technologies To Be
Carried
Forward To The Obj££*iM8i<!i AsadS System
Shadow Tactical UAV
Shadow 200 TUAV will provide
U S Army brigade
commanders with crucial
reconnaissance, surveillance,
and battlefield damage
intelligence — delivered
efficiently from the air
vehicle's electronic payload,
directly to tactical command
centers.
JTRS is a family of affordable, high-
capacity tactical radios to provide both
line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight C4I
covering an operating spectrum from 2
to 2000 MHz. JTRS will be capable of
transmitting voice, video and data. JTRS
will not be one radio but rather a family
of radios that are interoperable,
affordable and scaleable.
Summary
Strategic Benefits of Objective
•Revolutionary step forward in achieving
decisive US responsiveness
•Directly counters emerging anti-access threats
and strategies
•Powerful force dominates across spectrum:
Offense, Defense, Stability and Support.
•Greatly enhances US strategic agility —
Provides key to crisis response and
deterrence
Decisive around the globe, deploys and
fights anywhere
Demonstrates real commitment to allies
and adversaries
Conclusion
• US must maintain global responsiveness to
remain strategically dominant
• Current US power projection and decisive
strategies heavily threatened by time,
challenges to access, and changing environment
• Objective Force meets these challenges by
giving CINCs ability to insert decisive ground
power throughout Spectrum of Conflict
^Entry Operations
Decisive Operations
• Objective Force solves dilemma of trading
lethality & decisiveness for deployability and
responsiveness
• Objective Force is essential, affordable, near-
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